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1 Abstract
The aim of this technical report is to give a short overview of known techniques for network
tomography (introduced in the paper of Vardi (1996)), extended by a Bayesian approach
originating Tebaldi and West (1998). Since the studies of A.K. Erlang (1878-1929) on
telephone networks in the last millennium, lots of needs are seen in todays applications
of networks and network tomography, so for instance networks are a critical component
of the information structure supporting finance, commerce and even civil and national
defence. An attack on a network can be performed as an intrusion in the network or as
sending a lot of fault information and disturbing the network flow. Such attacks can be
detected by modelling the traffic flows in a network, by counting the source destination
packets and even by measuring counts over time and by drawing a comparison with this
’time series’ for instance.
2 Introduction
In order to know, find and understand the typical denial of service attack, it is necessary
to understand the principle of protocols transmitted over a network. As an example we
can look at the TCP protocol. The TCP-header is illustrated in figure 1.
One of the main features of TCP is the concept of ports. Each session to or from an
application is assigned a source port and a destination port. A source destination port
pairing is used to disambiguate multiple ongoing sessions between machines. TCP also
implements a two way connection scheme based on the usage of flags in the header. A
common interaction on a network will be, that the client sends a packet with a synchronize
flag set indication a communication. The destination then opens a port for the commu-
nication based on that request. The server is responding with both a synchronize and
an acknowledgement flag and then finally the client responds with an acknowledgement
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Figure 1: The TCP segment
flag. This is the three way handshake (see figure 2), which sets up the connection and
allows a two way communication (description in a very simply way). One idea of an
attack is to flood a computer with bogus requests or to cause it to devote resources to the
attack at the expense of the legitimate user of the system. The attacker is just sending
packets that request for a communication but never completes the three way handshake.
Another attack is to send packets via the network that are full of errors so that the victim
computer is forced to spend time with these errors. This results in a number of reset (or
other) packets with no obvious session.
We are able to compute detection probabilities in the following way (see Marchette (2005)
and Moore et al. (2001)). IP addresses are unique 32-bit numeric address of every host
and router on the Internet. ”‘Spoofing”’ denotes the changing of the source address to
a nonexistent address. We simply collect the packets with no obvious session. Assume
the spoofed IP addresses are generated randomly, uniformly and independently on all 232
addresses. We assume that d packets are sent in an attack on a victim in a network. If
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Figure 2: Three-Way-Handshake
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we monitor all packets to IP addresses, the probability of detecting an attack is given by
P (’detect an attack’) = 1−
(
1−
w
232
)d
with expected number of disturbing packets is given by
wd
232
,
where w denotes the number of monitored IP addresses. To infer how many packets were
originally sent we need to estimate the severity of an attack. Under the assumption of
independence probability of defining j packets as attacking packets is given by
P (j ’packets’) =
(
d
j
)( w
232
)j (
1−
w
232
)d−j
and the maximum likelihood estimate for d is given by
dˆ =
⌊
j 232
w
⌋
.
So if we see j packets, we can estimate the number of such attacks. From the literature
it is known that the assumption of independence the number of attack packets between
two detected packets, is given by
w∑
s=1
s
(
1−
w
N
)s−1 w
N
,
where N is the number of IP addresses used for randomly simulating those IP addresses
that are used by an attacker, w is the number of monitored IP addresses.
Another more sophisticated approach will be in monitoring and modelling the behaviour
of the packets in the flow through the network. Looking at the traffic we want to estimate
the network flow intensity. The aim will be to estimate the traffic intensities by two ways.
First we are able to measure source destination (directed) pairs of nodes and then perform
repeated measurements on the nodes to count packets (for example phone calls in routing,
emails and so on) transmitted over a communication network. One main assumption in
our mathematical model is, that we deal with a strongly connected network, which means,
that there always exists a directed path between any two nodes.
When we study the architecture of networks, we distinguish between two main groups
of networks – those that are deterministic (fixed routing) networks and those that are
random (Markovian routing) networks. In the first group we deal with directed paths
between the nodes, that are fixed and known for each communication. For the second
group the travelling of information (sending of packets) is determined by a fixed known
Markov chain. It can be easily seen that random routing is a special case of fixed routing.
A source destination pair (short SD) transports information from the source to the desti-
nation over a direct connected path in the network. We introduce c as the number of SD
pairs, which can be calculated from the number of nodes n by
c = (n− 1)n.
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Figure 3: Example of a directed network with four nodes
The number of transmitted information of a SD pair j at measurement period k is given by
X
(k)
j , which, like in classical ”teletraffic theory” is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution
with parameter λj, i.e.
X
(k)
j ∼ Po(λj).
We can formulate the SD transmission vector at period k by X(k) = (X
(k)
1 , ..., X
(k)
c )t.
For the modelling of the problem we need to introduce the r × c routing matrix A for a
deterministic network as a (0, 1)-matrix given by
A = (aij).
We get aij = 1 if the link i belongs to the directed path of the SD pair and aij = 0 if the
link i does not belong to the directed path of the SD pair.
Vardi (1996) gives several example networks, for instance such network is given in figure
3. It is a four-node directed network and consists of
c = (n− 1) · n = 3 · 4 = 12
SD pairs and seven directed links.
For better reading the routing matrix A is given for better reading in the table 2 with Yi
and Xj describing the structure displayed in table 2.
A X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Y1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Y4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Y6 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Y7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Table 1: Routing matrix A
The measured data on all links of the network is given by Y(k) = (Y
(k)
1 , ..., Y
(k)
r ), where
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Y1 : a→ b X1 : a→ b
Y2 : a→ c X2 : a→ c
Y3 : b→ a X3 : a→ c→ d
Y4 : b→ c X4 : b→ a
Y5 : c→ b X5 : b→ c
Y6 : c→ d X6 : b→ a→ c→ d
Y7 : d→ c X7 : c→ b→ a
X8 : c→ b
X9 : c→ d
X10 : d→ c→ b→ a
X11 : d→ c→ b
X12 : d→ c
Table 2: Structure represented in A
r denotes all directed links in the network with the property r = O(n) and c > r. The
formulation of the network model is given by
Y = AX (1)
and if we consider measurement periods k, we rewrite this as
Y(k) = AX(k).
The goal is to estimate λ = (λ1, ..., λc) from Y
(1), ...,Y(k). The following questions turn
up:
– Are the parameters identifiable?
– Are the estimates consistent?
The model we deal with is a linear one, but we cannot use a linear regression nor a
random effect model because we deal with a (0, 1)-matrix A, nonnegativity constraints
on the parameters and the Poisson assumption for the number of transmitted messages.
The identifiability of the parameter vector λ can be easily verified by the following lemma
(see Vardi (1996)).
Lemma If the columns of the routing matrix A are all distinct and each column has
at least one non-zero entry aij , then λ is identifiable.
The proof follows the principle of induction and we refer to Vardi (1996). If we find
a zero column in the routing matrix A, we can conclude that the corresponding SD pair
is not connected by a path, and if there is a zero row, then the corresponding link is not
a part of the network. This observations leads us to the following assertion:
Lemma If c > 2r − 1, then some rates λ1, ..., λc cannot be estimated separately.
3 Parameter Estimation
With this model setting we can apply classical maximum likelihood estimation (MLE),
also iterative expectation maximisation (EM) algorithms are also proposed in the litera-
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ture. Using maximum likelihood estimation we can expect problems due to the nonlinear
constraints. The structure of the log-likelihood function, which is to maximised, is hard
to evaluate. The likelihood equations read
∂l
∂λi
= 0 for i = 1, ..., c,
where l denotes the logarithm of the likelihood function L. In vector notation this can be
expressed as
1
K
K∑
k=1
Eλ[X
(k)|Y(k) = AX(k)]− λ = 0
X(k) are the complete (unobserved) data and Y(k) are the incomplete (observed) data. A
formulation of the EM algorithm under the assumption of independence of the k compo-
nents is given by
λ
(n+1) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[X(k)|Y(k),λ(n)].
A problem which we mark out here is, that the above given summands are hard to
calculate, since the solutions are located in the integer range. For finding a maximum it
is necessary, that the log-likelihood is concave. By evaluating the Hessian matrix H given
by
H = (
∂2l
∂λi∂λj
),
we see that this matrix is not necessarily negative semidefinite, so l is not necessarily
concave (see Vardi (1996)). A resolution of this problem is given by the following propo-
sition
Proposition 1 If λ∗ is an interior point, then for large K, l is concave in the neigh-
bourhood of λ∗.
Other estimation methods instead of MLE are based on normal approximations. Under
the assumption of normality:
X ∼ N(λ,Λ),
where Λ = diag(λ) is a c×c matrix, the joint distribution of (Xt,Yt)t assuming Y = AX
to hold is given by
(
X
Y
)
= Nc+r
((
λ
Aλ
)
,
(
λ ΛAt
AΛ AΛAt
))
.
The conditional distribution of X given Y is given by
X|Y ∼ Nc(λ+ΛA
t(AΛA)−1(Y −Aλ),Λ−At(AΛAt)−1AΛ)
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so we are able to approximate
E[X|Y,λ] ≈ λ+ΛAt(AΛAt)−1(Y −AΛ)
and get the following iteration formulae
λ
(n+1) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
[λ(n) +Λ(n)At(AΛ(n)At)−1(Y(k) −Aλ(n))].
At this point we should mention, that a priori all λi >> 0. Here we have to expect
nonnegligible approximation errors. Because of the matrix inversion some of the λ(i+1)
can be negative. Another approach that has been proposed in the literature is to assume
the sum of the Y(k) to be normally distributed,
Y¯ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Y(k) ∼ Nr(Aλ, K
−1AΛAt).
The log-likelihood of Y¯ is given by
l(λ) = − log |AΛAt| −K(Y¯ −Aλ)t(AΛAt)−1(Y¯ −Aλ)→ max
λi≥0
.
Another approach to the estimation problem is based on sample moments where Y¯ is
completely determined by the mean vector Aλ and the covariance matrix AΛAt of Y
and under the usage of the first and second moment we get
• Ê(Y) = Y¯ = Aλ
• Cov(Yi, Yh) =
1
K
∑
k Y
(k)
i Y
(k)
h − Y¯iY¯h =
∑c
l=1 ailahlλl for 1 ≤ i ≤ h ≤ r
where the first moment equation is independent of the Poisson assumption and the second
moment equation strongly depends on the Poisson model.
4 Prior Models for Network Tomography
In this section we will investigate the problem of computing and summarizing the joint
posterior distribution of p(X|Y) for all observed messages of SD pairs given the observed
link counts Y. For the posterior distribution we need a model for the prior distribution
p(X) to be tied together with Y = AX. Under the assumption, that the Xj are inde-
pendently Poisson distributed over the routs j, the prior specification is completed by a
prior of Λ. The joint distribution of the model is then given by
p(X,Λ) = p(Λ)
c∏
j=1
λ
Xj
j e
−λj
Xj ! .
We are interested in estimation of X since we can infer X and Λ from the joint distri-
bution. On a more advanced modelling standard we can also use hierarchical modeling
for the parameters λi. It is common in literature to model such hyperparameters by a
normal distribution N(µ, σ). Posterior computations are difficult to evaluate analytically.
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For example, it is unrealistic to evaluate them for large networks. For this purpose we
introduce some iterative MCMC simulation algorithms. As an example consider Gibbs
sampling, which iteratively resamples from the conditional posterior for elements of the
X and Λ variables. Under the usage of
p(Λ|X,Y) = p(Λ|X) =
c∏
j=1
p(λj |Xj),
whose components have the form of the prior density p(λj) multiplied by a gamma
function arising in the Poisson based likelihood function. It is possible to simulate new
Λ values as a set of independent drawing from the univariate posterior density. If the
prior densities are gamma densities or a mixture of gamma densities, these drawings
are trivially made from the corresponding gamma or mixed gamma posterior densities.
Otherwise, as proposed in literature, we have to use the rejection method or embedded
Metropolis Hasting steps in the MCMC scheme in the standard Metropolis - Gibbs frame-
work.
The theoretical structure of a general network model leads to the following theoretical
result for computing samples from the conditional posteriors. Let Λ be fixed and focus
on the conditional posterior p(X|Λ,Y), then we can use the following theorem due to
Tebaldi and West (1998).
Proposition 2 In the network model Y = AX and under the assumption that A has full
rank r, we can reorder the columns of A such, that the revised routing matrix has the
form
A = [A1,A2]
where A1 is a nonsingular r× r matrix. By similar reordering the elements of the vector
X and partitioning as Xt = (Xt1,X
t
2), it follows that
X1 = A
−1
1 (Y −A2X2).
This result easily follows from the fact that Y = AX = A1X1 +A2X2.
The full rank assumption is satisfied by all networks in real world. Otherwise there
is a redundancy in specification, and one or more rows of A can be deleted to get linear
independent rows. The result in the last proposition implies that, given Y and the
assumed values of the (c − r) route counts in X2, we are able to compute directly the
remaining r route flows simply based on the algebraic structure of the routing matrix.
For the reordering of the matrix A we can use the QR decomposition of arbitrary full
rank matrices. After the QR decomposition we get an r × r orthogonal matrix Q and
an r × c upper triangular matrix R, the first r columns of which correspond to r linear
independent columns of A. These are identified by a permutation of column indices.
With this knowledge we can deduce, that the conditional distribution p(X|Λ,Y) lies
in the c − r dimensional subspace defined by the partition A = [A1,A2]. After the
partitioning of the routing matrix A the posterior has the form
p(X1|X2,Λ,Y)p(X2|Λ,Y),
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where p(X1|X2,Λ,Y) is degenerated at X1 = A
−1
1
(Y −A2X2) with X2 = (Xr+1, .., Xc)
t
and X1 = (X1, ..., Xr)
t defined as above. The conditional is given by
p(X2|Λ,Y) ∝
c∏
a=1
λXaa
Xa!
with the support defined by Xa ≥ 0 for all a = 1, . . . , c. It is the product of independent
Poisson priors for the Xi constrained by the model and the reordering. The utility of this
expression is in delivering the set of complete conditional posteriors for elements of the
X2 vector to form a part of the iterative simulation approach to posterior analysis. Let´s
now consider each element Xi of X2, (i = r+ 1, . . . , c), and write X2,−i for the remaining
elements. The conditional distribution p(Xi|X2,−i,Λ,Y) is given by
p(Xi|X2,−i,Λ,Y) ∝
λXii
Xi!
r∏
a=1
λXaa
Xa!
,
over the support of the expression above. The linear constraints on Xi, i ∈ {r+1, . . . , c},
are of the form Xi ≥ di and Xi ≤ ei, where the values di and ei are functions of the
conditioning values of X2,−i and Y. Together with Xi ≥ 0 we obtain at most a set of
r+1 constraints on Xi. It is computationally very burdensome to evaluate directly these
constraints and identify their intersection. So we can make direct simulations.
For the simulation of the full posterior p(X,Λ|Y) we need now fixed starting values of
the route counts X. We can apply the following algorithm according to Tebaldi and West
(1998):
Algorithm
1. Draw sampled values of the rates Λ from c conditionally independent posteriors
p(λa|Xa),
2. conditioning on these values of Λ simulate a new X vector by sequencing through
i = r + 1, . . . , c, and at each step sample a new Xi with the conditioning elements
from the X2,−i set at their most recent sampled values,
3. iterate.
This is a known standard Gibbs sampling setup. Scalar elements of both Λ and X are
resampled from the relevant distribution conditional on most recently simulated values
of all other uncertain quantities. In step 2 we require evaluation of the support which is
best done by a simulation method such as embedded Metropolis-Hastings steps. We note
that from Y = AX it is possible to identify bounds on each Xi. A suitable range for the
proposal distribution can be computed from that.
5 Usage of Bayes Factors for Modelling of Network
Traffic
If there is a sequence of packets transmitted over a network, we can evaluate a statistical
profile of that sequence based on the information of the header and compare this to similar
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sequences in the past. This historical behaviour can be saved in a stochastic matrix where
each element of the matrix is given by
pjku = P (’SD’ = k|’SD before’ = j, ’IP of sender’ = u)
Since we know the header in the packet, we are able to model the behaviour of the sender
over time. We can base an analysis on these matrices. DuMouchel (1999) has made a
similar approach for modelling of the behaviour of commands in a shell. Since we use some
kind of categorical data, we are able to use the multinomial distribution as proposed in
the literature. For Bayesian inference we can use the Dirichlet (prior) distribution, which
is the natural conjugate distribution to the multinomial distribution.
Let p = (p1, ..., pK) be a random vector which is Dirichlet distributed with the density
f(p) =
Γ(
∑
k αk)
∏
k(p
αk−1
k )
Γ(αk)
with αi > 0 for all i. The multinomial probability for a count data vector n = (n1, ..., nK)
with n˜ =
∑
k nk is given by
P (n|p) = n˜!
∏
k
pnkk
nk!
From above formulas we get the marginal distribution
P (n) =
n˜!
α˜(α˜ + 1) · . . . · (α˜ + n˜− 1)
∏
k
αk(αk + 1) · . . . · (αk + nk − 1)
nk!
with α˜ =
∑
k αk. The posterior distribution is given by the following Dirichlet distribution
P (p|n) = (α˜ + n˜− 1)!
∏
k
pnk+αk−1k
(αk + nk − 1)!
On the idea that one user u in the network generates a sequence of T + 1 packets
C0, C1, ..., CT we can build the following hypotheses for a test of sending packets that
disturb the network
H0 : P (Ct = k|Ct−1 = j) = pjku
H1 : P (Ct = k|Ct−1 = j) = Qk
where
(Q1, ..., Qk) ∼ Dirichlet(α01, ..., α0k).
We make the assumption that the null hypothesis H0 says that a legitimate user is gener-
ating packets out of the profiles of the transition probabilities. The alternative hypothesis
H1 says, that T packets are sent through the network, are drawn randomly and indepen-
dently from a probability vector following a Dirichlet distribution with given hyperparam-
eters. These hyperparameters have to be estimated. H1 is more general than H0 since we
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do not know Q in comparison with the fully specified Pu = (pjku). H0 is not nested in
H1. For checking the practicability we suggest the usage of Bayes factors BF given by
BF =
P (C0, ..., CT |H1)
P (C0, ..., CT |H0)
for inference. For large BF we will prefer the alternative hypotheses. Instead of BF often
x = log(BF )
is used, which is called the ”weight of evidence”. We can see that modelling the behaviour
using the network with the network tomography and combining it with the concepts of
Bayes factors we are able to implement a large apparatus for monitoring networks and to
draw a conclusion whether there is an attack on our monitored network.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we gave an overview of the current literature in network modelling and
network tomography. We extended that field by developing a method for monitoring
networks with Bayes factors for testing hypothesis testing whether there is an intruder
in the network, who performs several forms of attacks. This method can be implemented
with the usage of control charts which are common in quality control for monitoring
networks. Further work will be in random routing networks – for an overview of current
applications we refer to Vardi (1996). The methodologies developed here should be also
applicable for these kinds of networks. Results and implementation will be given in further
technical reports.
7 References
Castro, R., Coates, M., Liang, G., Nowak, R., Yu,B. (2004) Network Tomogra-
phy: Recent Developments. Statistical Science 19 (3): 499–517
DuMouchel, W. (1999) Computer Intrusion Detection Based on Bayes Factors for
Comparing Command Transition Probabilities. National Institute of Statistical Sci-
ences (NISS), Technical Report Number 91
Marchette, D. J. (2001) Computer Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring: A
Statistical Viewpoint. New York: Springer
Marchette, D. J. (2005) Passive Detection of Denial of Service Attacks on the Internet.
In: Statistical Methods in Computer Security. Dekker: New York
McCulloch, R. (1998) Bayesian Inference on Network Traffic Using Link Count Data:
Comment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 93 (442): 575
Moore, D., Voelker, G.M., Savage, S. (2001) Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service
Activity. USENIX Security Symposium’01. www.usenix.org/publications
/library/proceedings/sec01/moore.html
Tanenbaum, A. S. (1996) Computer Networks. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall
12 Pluch Ph., Wakounig S.
Tebaldi, C., West, M. (1998) Bayesian Inference on Network Traffic Using Link Count
Data. Journal of the American Statistical Association 93 (442): 557–573
Vardi, Y. (1998) Bayesian Inference on Network Traffic Using Link Count Data: Com-
ment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 93 (442): 573–574
Vardi, Y. (1996) Network tomography: Estimating source-destination traffic intensities
from link data. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91 (433): 365–377
Willinger, W., Paxson, V. (1998) Where mathematics meets the internet. Notices of
the American Mathematical Society 45 (8): 961–970
Wakounig, S. (2005) Einfache statistische Ansa¨tze fu¨r Intrusion Detection Systeme.
MSc Thesis. University of Klagenfurt. Department of Applied Statistics.
